Matteo Broso


I am a Ph.D. student in Economics at the University of Torino and Collegio Carlo Alberto. 

I am also a Research Fellow (Assegnista di Ricerca) at Politecnico di Torino.

My research interests are in the fields of Industrial Organization, Political Economy, and Labor Economics. 

CV (July 2024)

Working Papers

I study a product differentiation model where a politically tied public firm competes with a private one in qualities and prices. I show that the public firm may mimic the median voter’s preferences to maximize consensus. Then, I study the effects of partial privatization. Depending on the degree of privatization, (i) the private firm may enter the market or not; (ii) the public firm’s profits may exceed those of its competitor. I also show that the socially optimal degree of privatization is interior.

We study the impact of market concentration on elections and lobbying in a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard. Two incumbent firms can lobby a politician (P) to prevent a pro-competitive reform. P's type determines whether they care about bribes or not. A representative voter tries to infer P's type monitoring the policymaking process. We investigate the welfare implications of a merger between the two firms. In equilibrium, the merger increases firms' incentives to lobby and their ability to influence politics. This additional political power reduces the chances that the pro-competitive reform is approved, hurting consumers; but it allows the voter to defeat a corruptible P with higher probability. Thus, it improves the voter's screening and mitigates adverse selection. We discuss how this new trade-off interacts with traditional competition considerations in the merger's assessment.

Work in Progress