Working Papers

I study a product differentiation model where a politically tied public firm competes with a private one in qualities and prices. I show that the public firm may mimic the median voter’s preferences to maximize consensus. Then, I study the effects of partial privatization. Depending on the degree of privatization, (i) the private firm may enter the market or not; (ii) the public firm’s profits may exceed those of its competitor. I also show that the socially optimal degree of privatization is interior.

Mathematica Replication Package

Work in Progress

Gender Prescribed Occupations and the Wage Gap (with Andrea Gallice and Caterina Muratori)

Entry Deregulation, Industry Dynamics and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Italian Restaurants (with Carlo Cambini, Giacomo Rosso, Lorien Sabatino)

It Takes Two to Tango: Mergers, Lobbying and Elections (with Tommaso Valletti)